Sometimes having a lot of money can actually be a curse. Less money means you have to think more, and more strategically, about how you're going to spend it. When you have a big pot of cash, every idea seems like a good idea and it's easy not to take the time to prioritize or consider how a project is really within your [organization's] purview and principles.
In addition to less money forcing you to be more strategic and thoughtful about how to spend, I think it also forces you to be more creative. We don't always take the opportunity to think creatively when we have a lot of money to spend because we just don't have to. You don't have to think outside the box when you can afford to stay inside the box. "You don't have to move outside the box if you can afford the rent inside." Things can be missed this way.
The OTI Afghanistan program is significantly different from OTI programs in the rest of the world in many ways. But one of the differences, which I also find problematic, is the enormous amount of money that's flown through the program. Especially in the south (where I work), the message coming from leadership in the recent past has been to burn money fast (leadership who are no longer in place, partly for this reason). Typically, OTI works on relatively small budgets, and I think the resources in Afghanistan have contributed to OTI losing some of its comparative advantage and strategic edge. We've just been doing anything and everything because we've had the money to do it, rather than taking the time to think about strategic yeast and change agents and being catalysts for peace. I think we look a lot more like "big AID" than we're supposed to.
OTI is supposed to be doing innovative and creative projects. And while there's no need to constantly re-inventing the wheel, and we should be learning from what works - I've so far seen very few projects that seem to be really exciting or innovative. Lots of school refurbishments, canal reconstructions, infrastructure projects. Building things. It's not that we should only do things that are sensational - sometimes a well might be the exact thing that's needed to address instability in an area. But I'd like to see us thinking outside the box a bit more. There's a lot more we can do with our money besides build things. I came to Afghanistan because I want to think creatively and strategically about how to build peace here, not to manage drainage ditch-cleaning projects. Fortunately, there is a big push to slow down, change direction, and get back to our OTI "roots" (partly because the money isn't flowing quite as freely from Congress as it was a year ago).
Question to think about then: What is the opportunity in having vast resources?
Well, it may not force you to think strategically and creatively, but it doesn't prohibit you from doing so. And if you come up with an amazing idea that is also expensive, you can afford it! You can also operate in more places. You don't have to do huge projects - you can do small, strategic, creative projects in more areas. Opportunity for breadth. You can feel free to take more risks that might pay off. If you only have $5k, you might not want to use it on the creative but risky idea. But if you have $15k, you'd probably be more willing to give it a go and less worried about failure.
Tuesday, 28 June 2011
Some Responses to Your Comments
Strategic Yeast vs. Tipping Point
I haven't read Gladwell's book, but Lederach references it in his chapter on Strategic Yeast. He does parallel his critical yeast concept with what he calls "the original key insight" of critical mass, which Gladwell talks about - "what initial, even small things made exponentially greater things possible." However, it's my understanding that Gladwell is still operating on a bit of a "critical mass" theory of change, in that small things may build to a tipping point, but it's the "tipping point" that changes things. I'm not sure Strategic Yeast works the same way. Some quotes from Lederach's book that I find helpful in understanding the concept:
Brainstorming
Perhaps there is a balance to be struck between just flat-out asking local communities what they need and just doing assessments and determining the needs ourselves. Perhaps that's where participatory processes come into play - not just asking them for wish lists, but involving them in the assessment process. We just have to be careful of making locals process-weary. I'm sure it's annoying if every time a new outside actor comes into play, they want the community to do another assessment. And they're probably thinking, "We've done this 5 times already - here's what we need!" Thus, the wish list. So I think it's important to make sure as outsiders we do our due diligence and find out what assessments and activities have already been done in a place.
How do you make sure you're positioned to act, provided you can actually identify the "yeast"?
What does this look like on a programmatic, organizational, or national scale? I think maybe it's doing due diligence on a daily basis, acting responsibly and ethically, and then being astute enough to see what you are positioned to do when there's something to be done at critical junctures. Knowing strengths, weaknesses, capacities, mandates, particular situational dynamics. And knowing when you aren't positioned to act, and choosing not to act in those times. Maybe taking those as learning moments to evaluate whether you should/could have been better positioned to act at that time, and what changes you can try to make now to potentially be better positioned in the future.
What analysis does OTI do to find yeast?
I know there is an initial country assessment and 4 criteria for engagement: (1) Is there a window of opportunity? (2) Is OTI uniquely positioned to contribute? (3) Is the operating environment sufficiently stable? (4) Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? (Oooh, my least favorite one!). For more info on engagement criteria, click here. Evaluation of these criteria on the ground (over a 2-3 week period) results in a "go/no-go" decision (Interesting fact: The initial OTI assessment in Afghanistan in 2009 actually resulted in a "no-go" decision. Powers that be didn't like that, and - for better or worse - here we are 2 years later). I'm not sure if there is more structure to the assessment process than simply these criteria; I actually have an RFI in to the DC office to learn more about how this all happens. I don't know if it involves any kind of framework for identifying the people/organizations/parties/type of programs to engage.
In Afghanistan, we use the District Stability Framework (DSF) to identify sources of instability in particular areas and design activities to address them. However, I'm not sure we have a good framework for identifying yeast: change agents and capacities for peace. I don't know if we are really identifying and empowering change agents as part of our stability strategy. I think we could probably be doing more to capitalize on the good already in communities, but perhaps we take for granted (COIN!) that GIRoA is the change agent we're here to empower. Perhaps we are missing other change agents and/or even at times trying to empower the wrong people and networks because we've gone in with the assumption that the government is "the good guys."
Activities that are "strategic and political", not based on "need"
I think there definitely needs to be needs-based assistance. Actors who say, If you're hurt, we'll give you medical attention; If you're starving, we'll give you food, etc. But I don't think needs-based activities help to resolve conflict or build peace. They sustain life and that's what they're supposed to do. Sometimes, needs-based activities can actually exacerbate conflict. Maybe at times this is unavoidable - you can't ask someone if they're going to kill 10 more people before tying a tourniquet on his leg to save his life. Love, I think, can't discriminate. Need shouldn't be ignored - that's why we have OFDA! - but I think you have to be more strategic and political to build peace. We can't ask all organizations to be guided by humanitarian principles, as long as they don't claim to be humanitarian organizations (which OTI doesn't do).
Assistance guided by U.S. interests
First of all, when OTI says its interventions are political, it doesn't necessarily mean what we do is only to serve American political interests, but that what we do is supposed to serve a purpose beyond just meeting a need. It's not about WHAT we do, but WHY we do it. If we build a road, it's not because the community needed a road, but because the road built up people's confidence in GIRoA (for example). We do activities to achieve a purpose beyond just the immediate output. We aren't neutral and we don't claim to be. I do see that this can become problematic when you ask the questions: What values guide our agenda and strategy? How do we determine the political ends we want to see? If we're not neutral, who decides and how do they decide the parties we're going to support? Or even the outcomes or policies? That gets sticky. If it's purely U.S. national interests - then yes, I think that's a recipe for disaster and I don't really want to be a part of it. But if we can somehow be guided by other principles, like global or community interests, I think it's often that those are in our national interests as well.
But it really is different working for USG rather than an NGO. In an NGO you really don't have to think about national interests or strategy or policy - you're driven by your own mission. But OTI is USG. We clearly articulate as one of our engagement criteria that engagement must be in the U.S. national interest. But it seems like even though - in Afghanistan - at times we may be constrained by national policy, I don't get that most people are here just to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan. I sense most OTI people are here because they want to help make Afghanistan a better place for Afghans. We just need to keep thinking critically about policies and strategies that guide our interventions, and ask the question, "Whose interest does this serve?"
Does the why/how/morality behind actions matter if more aren't benefited at the end of the day?
This question pits my principled nature against my pragmatic one. I don't believe the ends justify the means. But I do think there's serious value in questioning the why/how/morality behind actions if the actions aren't actually benefiting people in the end. I think the point of why/how/morality is that it's supposed to benefit other people. If people aren't being helped, maybe you should question your principles. Of course, all this hinges on a definition of what it means to "benefit" people. Certainly there can be short-term benefit that is long-term harmful. And I don't think outcomes in themselves justify principles. If something good happens, that doesn't necessarily mean your why/how/morality is good - sometimes you just get lucky. So I think it's imperative that actions be guided by principles, but then we need to test and refine our principles by what actually happens.
I haven't read Gladwell's book, but Lederach references it in his chapter on Strategic Yeast. He does parallel his critical yeast concept with what he calls "the original key insight" of critical mass, which Gladwell talks about - "what initial, even small things made exponentially greater things possible." However, it's my understanding that Gladwell is still operating on a bit of a "critical mass" theory of change, in that small things may build to a tipping point, but it's the "tipping point" that changes things. I'm not sure Strategic Yeast works the same way. Some quotes from Lederach's book that I find helpful in understanding the concept:
- "Who, though not like-minded or like-situated in this context of conflict, would have a capacity, if they were mixed and held together, to make things grow exponentially, beyond their numbers?"
- "A few strategically connected people have greater potential for creating the social growth of an idea or process than large numbers of people who think alike. When social change fails, look first to the nature of who was engaged and what gaps exist in the connections among different sets of people."
Brainstorming
- Intuition
- Based on research, analysis, observation, sensitivity
- Subjective, but based on objective factors
- Risk - you might be wrong
- Difficulty as outsiders lacking thorough understanding of context, history, culture, power, communication
Perhaps there is a balance to be struck between just flat-out asking local communities what they need and just doing assessments and determining the needs ourselves. Perhaps that's where participatory processes come into play - not just asking them for wish lists, but involving them in the assessment process. We just have to be careful of making locals process-weary. I'm sure it's annoying if every time a new outside actor comes into play, they want the community to do another assessment. And they're probably thinking, "We've done this 5 times already - here's what we need!" Thus, the wish list. So I think it's important to make sure as outsiders we do our due diligence and find out what assessments and activities have already been done in a place.
How do you make sure you're positioned to act, provided you can actually identify the "yeast"?
What does this look like on a programmatic, organizational, or national scale? I think maybe it's doing due diligence on a daily basis, acting responsibly and ethically, and then being astute enough to see what you are positioned to do when there's something to be done at critical junctures. Knowing strengths, weaknesses, capacities, mandates, particular situational dynamics. And knowing when you aren't positioned to act, and choosing not to act in those times. Maybe taking those as learning moments to evaluate whether you should/could have been better positioned to act at that time, and what changes you can try to make now to potentially be better positioned in the future.
What analysis does OTI do to find yeast?
I know there is an initial country assessment and 4 criteria for engagement: (1) Is there a window of opportunity? (2) Is OTI uniquely positioned to contribute? (3) Is the operating environment sufficiently stable? (4) Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? (Oooh, my least favorite one!). For more info on engagement criteria, click here. Evaluation of these criteria on the ground (over a 2-3 week period) results in a "go/no-go" decision (Interesting fact: The initial OTI assessment in Afghanistan in 2009 actually resulted in a "no-go" decision. Powers that be didn't like that, and - for better or worse - here we are 2 years later). I'm not sure if there is more structure to the assessment process than simply these criteria; I actually have an RFI in to the DC office to learn more about how this all happens. I don't know if it involves any kind of framework for identifying the people/organizations/parties/type of programs to engage.
In Afghanistan, we use the District Stability Framework (DSF) to identify sources of instability in particular areas and design activities to address them. However, I'm not sure we have a good framework for identifying yeast: change agents and capacities for peace. I don't know if we are really identifying and empowering change agents as part of our stability strategy. I think we could probably be doing more to capitalize on the good already in communities, but perhaps we take for granted (COIN!) that GIRoA is the change agent we're here to empower. Perhaps we are missing other change agents and/or even at times trying to empower the wrong people and networks because we've gone in with the assumption that the government is "the good guys."
Activities that are "strategic and political", not based on "need"
I think there definitely needs to be needs-based assistance. Actors who say, If you're hurt, we'll give you medical attention; If you're starving, we'll give you food, etc. But I don't think needs-based activities help to resolve conflict or build peace. They sustain life and that's what they're supposed to do. Sometimes, needs-based activities can actually exacerbate conflict. Maybe at times this is unavoidable - you can't ask someone if they're going to kill 10 more people before tying a tourniquet on his leg to save his life. Love, I think, can't discriminate. Need shouldn't be ignored - that's why we have OFDA! - but I think you have to be more strategic and political to build peace. We can't ask all organizations to be guided by humanitarian principles, as long as they don't claim to be humanitarian organizations (which OTI doesn't do).
Assistance guided by U.S. interests
First of all, when OTI says its interventions are political, it doesn't necessarily mean what we do is only to serve American political interests, but that what we do is supposed to serve a purpose beyond just meeting a need. It's not about WHAT we do, but WHY we do it. If we build a road, it's not because the community needed a road, but because the road built up people's confidence in GIRoA (for example). We do activities to achieve a purpose beyond just the immediate output. We aren't neutral and we don't claim to be. I do see that this can become problematic when you ask the questions: What values guide our agenda and strategy? How do we determine the political ends we want to see? If we're not neutral, who decides and how do they decide the parties we're going to support? Or even the outcomes or policies? That gets sticky. If it's purely U.S. national interests - then yes, I think that's a recipe for disaster and I don't really want to be a part of it. But if we can somehow be guided by other principles, like global or community interests, I think it's often that those are in our national interests as well.
But it really is different working for USG rather than an NGO. In an NGO you really don't have to think about national interests or strategy or policy - you're driven by your own mission. But OTI is USG. We clearly articulate as one of our engagement criteria that engagement must be in the U.S. national interest. But it seems like even though - in Afghanistan - at times we may be constrained by national policy, I don't get that most people are here just to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan. I sense most OTI people are here because they want to help make Afghanistan a better place for Afghans. We just need to keep thinking critically about policies and strategies that guide our interventions, and ask the question, "Whose interest does this serve?"
Does the why/how/morality behind actions matter if more aren't benefited at the end of the day?
This question pits my principled nature against my pragmatic one. I don't believe the ends justify the means. But I do think there's serious value in questioning the why/how/morality behind actions if the actions aren't actually benefiting people in the end. I think the point of why/how/morality is that it's supposed to benefit other people. If people aren't being helped, maybe you should question your principles. Of course, all this hinges on a definition of what it means to "benefit" people. Certainly there can be short-term benefit that is long-term harmful. And I don't think outcomes in themselves justify principles. If something good happens, that doesn't necessarily mean your why/how/morality is good - sometimes you just get lucky. So I think it's imperative that actions be guided by principles, but then we need to test and refine our principles by what actually happens.
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