Before I started my job with OTI, I was a little concerned about what it would be like to work with a bunch of men in a war zone. Would I be respected? Would my opinions and insight be valued? Would it be a daily struggle to get people to take me seriously?
My initial fears were quickly allayed when I began my training with all those future male colleagues and realized the plus-side of being one of the few women in a room full of men: I was a hot commodity! Not only was I not ignored or de-valued, but I got extra attention. People wanted to talk to me; I got free coffee and rides home! This was a bit disorienting at first (note: 80% female grad school program), but I won't deny it was pretty nice. This experience so far has helped me value my identity as a woman in ways I previously had not. I'm realizing that for much of my life, I've seen my gender as a liability, but now I'm learning to recognize and appreciate my femininity as value-added to people around me and the world.
However, after 2 months at KAF, the "honeymoon" period of basking in the limelight is beginning to wear off a little. I still feel like I'm treated really well by my colleagues 98% of the time - I get doors opened for me, people letting me go in front of them in line at the DFAC, and favors from our somewhat cantankerous facilities managers that my male colleagues swear they could never get. I don't notice it too much, but my friends tell me I get stared at walking around the base (my OTI colleague Dan said that for the first few days he was here, he couldn't figure out why everyone was looking at him when we were together - then he realized they were looking at me). So I know I'm conspicuous, but in professional settings, I've been feeling a bit invisible of late.
When people come into the OTI office with a question, they naturally go straight to my supervisor, a man, for the answers. But sometimes I even notice it a little with Dan - that people will defer to him for answers and responses when we're together, even though we have the same level position and I've been at KAF longer than he has. And I feel most invisible at military meetings, which often seem like a "good ol' boys" club, where I feel awkward and out of place. There are many reasons for these professional tensions that have nothing to do with gender - I'm new, I'm young, I'm a civilian, my desk is in a corner of our office that makes it easier to face Rod and Dan than me when people walk in the door. And - truth be told - I often don't have the answers people are looking for when they come to our office; I simply just don't know enough yet. So there's no reason to get all pissy and sensitive about how I'm treated as a woman in the office. Yet, the gender thing is there, and I notice it. Fortunately, I have the mantra of lessons from the job search running through my mind most days: Fight. Don't indulge self-pity. Access the good even in difficult circumstances. Perseverance, hope, patience. It may be harder for me professionally as a woman, or it may not be - regardless, all there is to do is run the race in front of me and tackle the obstacles I encounter, because we all encounter obstacles and mine certainly are not the most onerous. A friend of mine who is also in the Army had some good advice when it comes to first having to battle to get the military to take you seriously:
The only solution to that is to try to find one person in the meeting you can convince, and then convince them. Then find a second and have the first guy convince him that you can help. And from there on you build an army.
Or, plan B is to flirt with them. May not help your credibility, but you may get to go out on a mission with them if they think you will make out with them because they took you.
So, you can go either way with it. It's ok if it's all for the greater good, right? We are trying to win a war here.
So at least I've got options :). But what is more disturbing to me than simply my personal struggles is the fact that on the whole, women are conspicuously absent from most strategic development, planning and implementation across the board - from lethal operations to governance and development (because even though civilians like to think they are driving things, the military still overwhelmingly outnumber us and therefore have the lead even on governance and development issues, for better or for worse [and don't assume I necessarily think it's for worse - I really don't know most days]). Or perhaps I should say women are inconspicuously absent, because I haven't really noticed anyone caring much that women are not a part of these discussions. The other day I was the only woman in a briefing on a topic I studied fairly extensively in grad school, the implementation of which is being completely driven by the military in Afghanistan. This bothered me on numerous levels, but the absence of women was one. Not that men don't have completely brilliant ideas, but when women aren't part of the planning, you are inevitably going to be missing something. No offense to my brilliant and honorable male colleagues, but I wonder if we might be doing a little better in Afghanistan if women were more involved in developing our strategy here.
And this doesn't even touch on the issue of Afghan women's issues, and how difficult they are to access and consult in a divided society, especially when the war/peacebuilding/development effort is being led by men. There are certainly a few efforts being made with Female Engagement Teams and the like, but I can't help thinking this is a big missing piece that we are nowhere close to adequately addressing. If you want to know what invisible looks like, try finding an Afghan woman as a foreign man in Afghanistan.
I don't know what the answers are, but I know this: gender matters. It matters for me, it matters for U.S. policymaking, and it matters for Afghanistan.
Saturday, 30 July 2011
Tuesday, 28 June 2011
Money: Maybe Less is Actually More
Sometimes having a lot of money can actually be a curse. Less money means you have to think more, and more strategically, about how you're going to spend it. When you have a big pot of cash, every idea seems like a good idea and it's easy not to take the time to prioritize or consider how a project is really within your [organization's] purview and principles.
In addition to less money forcing you to be more strategic and thoughtful about how to spend, I think it also forces you to be more creative. We don't always take the opportunity to think creatively when we have a lot of money to spend because we just don't have to. You don't have to think outside the box when you can afford to stay inside the box. "You don't have to move outside the box if you can afford the rent inside." Things can be missed this way.
The OTI Afghanistan program is significantly different from OTI programs in the rest of the world in many ways. But one of the differences, which I also find problematic, is the enormous amount of money that's flown through the program. Especially in the south (where I work), the message coming from leadership in the recent past has been to burn money fast (leadership who are no longer in place, partly for this reason). Typically, OTI works on relatively small budgets, and I think the resources in Afghanistan have contributed to OTI losing some of its comparative advantage and strategic edge. We've just been doing anything and everything because we've had the money to do it, rather than taking the time to think about strategic yeast and change agents and being catalysts for peace. I think we look a lot more like "big AID" than we're supposed to.
OTI is supposed to be doing innovative and creative projects. And while there's no need to constantly re-inventing the wheel, and we should be learning from what works - I've so far seen very few projects that seem to be really exciting or innovative. Lots of school refurbishments, canal reconstructions, infrastructure projects. Building things. It's not that we should only do things that are sensational - sometimes a well might be the exact thing that's needed to address instability in an area. But I'd like to see us thinking outside the box a bit more. There's a lot more we can do with our money besides build things. I came to Afghanistan because I want to think creatively and strategically about how to build peace here, not to manage drainage ditch-cleaning projects. Fortunately, there is a big push to slow down, change direction, and get back to our OTI "roots" (partly because the money isn't flowing quite as freely from Congress as it was a year ago).
Question to think about then: What is the opportunity in having vast resources?
Well, it may not force you to think strategically and creatively, but it doesn't prohibit you from doing so. And if you come up with an amazing idea that is also expensive, you can afford it! You can also operate in more places. You don't have to do huge projects - you can do small, strategic, creative projects in more areas. Opportunity for breadth. You can feel free to take more risks that might pay off. If you only have $5k, you might not want to use it on the creative but risky idea. But if you have $15k, you'd probably be more willing to give it a go and less worried about failure.
In addition to less money forcing you to be more strategic and thoughtful about how to spend, I think it also forces you to be more creative. We don't always take the opportunity to think creatively when we have a lot of money to spend because we just don't have to. You don't have to think outside the box when you can afford to stay inside the box. "You don't have to move outside the box if you can afford the rent inside." Things can be missed this way.
The OTI Afghanistan program is significantly different from OTI programs in the rest of the world in many ways. But one of the differences, which I also find problematic, is the enormous amount of money that's flown through the program. Especially in the south (where I work), the message coming from leadership in the recent past has been to burn money fast (leadership who are no longer in place, partly for this reason). Typically, OTI works on relatively small budgets, and I think the resources in Afghanistan have contributed to OTI losing some of its comparative advantage and strategic edge. We've just been doing anything and everything because we've had the money to do it, rather than taking the time to think about strategic yeast and change agents and being catalysts for peace. I think we look a lot more like "big AID" than we're supposed to.
OTI is supposed to be doing innovative and creative projects. And while there's no need to constantly re-inventing the wheel, and we should be learning from what works - I've so far seen very few projects that seem to be really exciting or innovative. Lots of school refurbishments, canal reconstructions, infrastructure projects. Building things. It's not that we should only do things that are sensational - sometimes a well might be the exact thing that's needed to address instability in an area. But I'd like to see us thinking outside the box a bit more. There's a lot more we can do with our money besides build things. I came to Afghanistan because I want to think creatively and strategically about how to build peace here, not to manage drainage ditch-cleaning projects. Fortunately, there is a big push to slow down, change direction, and get back to our OTI "roots" (partly because the money isn't flowing quite as freely from Congress as it was a year ago).
Question to think about then: What is the opportunity in having vast resources?
Well, it may not force you to think strategically and creatively, but it doesn't prohibit you from doing so. And if you come up with an amazing idea that is also expensive, you can afford it! You can also operate in more places. You don't have to do huge projects - you can do small, strategic, creative projects in more areas. Opportunity for breadth. You can feel free to take more risks that might pay off. If you only have $5k, you might not want to use it on the creative but risky idea. But if you have $15k, you'd probably be more willing to give it a go and less worried about failure.
Some Responses to Your Comments
Strategic Yeast vs. Tipping Point
I haven't read Gladwell's book, but Lederach references it in his chapter on Strategic Yeast. He does parallel his critical yeast concept with what he calls "the original key insight" of critical mass, which Gladwell talks about - "what initial, even small things made exponentially greater things possible." However, it's my understanding that Gladwell is still operating on a bit of a "critical mass" theory of change, in that small things may build to a tipping point, but it's the "tipping point" that changes things. I'm not sure Strategic Yeast works the same way. Some quotes from Lederach's book that I find helpful in understanding the concept:
Brainstorming
Perhaps there is a balance to be struck between just flat-out asking local communities what they need and just doing assessments and determining the needs ourselves. Perhaps that's where participatory processes come into play - not just asking them for wish lists, but involving them in the assessment process. We just have to be careful of making locals process-weary. I'm sure it's annoying if every time a new outside actor comes into play, they want the community to do another assessment. And they're probably thinking, "We've done this 5 times already - here's what we need!" Thus, the wish list. So I think it's important to make sure as outsiders we do our due diligence and find out what assessments and activities have already been done in a place.
How do you make sure you're positioned to act, provided you can actually identify the "yeast"?
What does this look like on a programmatic, organizational, or national scale? I think maybe it's doing due diligence on a daily basis, acting responsibly and ethically, and then being astute enough to see what you are positioned to do when there's something to be done at critical junctures. Knowing strengths, weaknesses, capacities, mandates, particular situational dynamics. And knowing when you aren't positioned to act, and choosing not to act in those times. Maybe taking those as learning moments to evaluate whether you should/could have been better positioned to act at that time, and what changes you can try to make now to potentially be better positioned in the future.
What analysis does OTI do to find yeast?
I know there is an initial country assessment and 4 criteria for engagement: (1) Is there a window of opportunity? (2) Is OTI uniquely positioned to contribute? (3) Is the operating environment sufficiently stable? (4) Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? (Oooh, my least favorite one!). For more info on engagement criteria, click here. Evaluation of these criteria on the ground (over a 2-3 week period) results in a "go/no-go" decision (Interesting fact: The initial OTI assessment in Afghanistan in 2009 actually resulted in a "no-go" decision. Powers that be didn't like that, and - for better or worse - here we are 2 years later). I'm not sure if there is more structure to the assessment process than simply these criteria; I actually have an RFI in to the DC office to learn more about how this all happens. I don't know if it involves any kind of framework for identifying the people/organizations/parties/type of programs to engage.
In Afghanistan, we use the District Stability Framework (DSF) to identify sources of instability in particular areas and design activities to address them. However, I'm not sure we have a good framework for identifying yeast: change agents and capacities for peace. I don't know if we are really identifying and empowering change agents as part of our stability strategy. I think we could probably be doing more to capitalize on the good already in communities, but perhaps we take for granted (COIN!) that GIRoA is the change agent we're here to empower. Perhaps we are missing other change agents and/or even at times trying to empower the wrong people and networks because we've gone in with the assumption that the government is "the good guys."
Activities that are "strategic and political", not based on "need"
I think there definitely needs to be needs-based assistance. Actors who say, If you're hurt, we'll give you medical attention; If you're starving, we'll give you food, etc. But I don't think needs-based activities help to resolve conflict or build peace. They sustain life and that's what they're supposed to do. Sometimes, needs-based activities can actually exacerbate conflict. Maybe at times this is unavoidable - you can't ask someone if they're going to kill 10 more people before tying a tourniquet on his leg to save his life. Love, I think, can't discriminate. Need shouldn't be ignored - that's why we have OFDA! - but I think you have to be more strategic and political to build peace. We can't ask all organizations to be guided by humanitarian principles, as long as they don't claim to be humanitarian organizations (which OTI doesn't do).
Assistance guided by U.S. interests
First of all, when OTI says its interventions are political, it doesn't necessarily mean what we do is only to serve American political interests, but that what we do is supposed to serve a purpose beyond just meeting a need. It's not about WHAT we do, but WHY we do it. If we build a road, it's not because the community needed a road, but because the road built up people's confidence in GIRoA (for example). We do activities to achieve a purpose beyond just the immediate output. We aren't neutral and we don't claim to be. I do see that this can become problematic when you ask the questions: What values guide our agenda and strategy? How do we determine the political ends we want to see? If we're not neutral, who decides and how do they decide the parties we're going to support? Or even the outcomes or policies? That gets sticky. If it's purely U.S. national interests - then yes, I think that's a recipe for disaster and I don't really want to be a part of it. But if we can somehow be guided by other principles, like global or community interests, I think it's often that those are in our national interests as well.
But it really is different working for USG rather than an NGO. In an NGO you really don't have to think about national interests or strategy or policy - you're driven by your own mission. But OTI is USG. We clearly articulate as one of our engagement criteria that engagement must be in the U.S. national interest. But it seems like even though - in Afghanistan - at times we may be constrained by national policy, I don't get that most people are here just to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan. I sense most OTI people are here because they want to help make Afghanistan a better place for Afghans. We just need to keep thinking critically about policies and strategies that guide our interventions, and ask the question, "Whose interest does this serve?"
Does the why/how/morality behind actions matter if more aren't benefited at the end of the day?
This question pits my principled nature against my pragmatic one. I don't believe the ends justify the means. But I do think there's serious value in questioning the why/how/morality behind actions if the actions aren't actually benefiting people in the end. I think the point of why/how/morality is that it's supposed to benefit other people. If people aren't being helped, maybe you should question your principles. Of course, all this hinges on a definition of what it means to "benefit" people. Certainly there can be short-term benefit that is long-term harmful. And I don't think outcomes in themselves justify principles. If something good happens, that doesn't necessarily mean your why/how/morality is good - sometimes you just get lucky. So I think it's imperative that actions be guided by principles, but then we need to test and refine our principles by what actually happens.
I haven't read Gladwell's book, but Lederach references it in his chapter on Strategic Yeast. He does parallel his critical yeast concept with what he calls "the original key insight" of critical mass, which Gladwell talks about - "what initial, even small things made exponentially greater things possible." However, it's my understanding that Gladwell is still operating on a bit of a "critical mass" theory of change, in that small things may build to a tipping point, but it's the "tipping point" that changes things. I'm not sure Strategic Yeast works the same way. Some quotes from Lederach's book that I find helpful in understanding the concept:
- "Who, though not like-minded or like-situated in this context of conflict, would have a capacity, if they were mixed and held together, to make things grow exponentially, beyond their numbers?"
- "A few strategically connected people have greater potential for creating the social growth of an idea or process than large numbers of people who think alike. When social change fails, look first to the nature of who was engaged and what gaps exist in the connections among different sets of people."
Brainstorming
- Intuition
- Based on research, analysis, observation, sensitivity
- Subjective, but based on objective factors
- Risk - you might be wrong
- Difficulty as outsiders lacking thorough understanding of context, history, culture, power, communication
Perhaps there is a balance to be struck between just flat-out asking local communities what they need and just doing assessments and determining the needs ourselves. Perhaps that's where participatory processes come into play - not just asking them for wish lists, but involving them in the assessment process. We just have to be careful of making locals process-weary. I'm sure it's annoying if every time a new outside actor comes into play, they want the community to do another assessment. And they're probably thinking, "We've done this 5 times already - here's what we need!" Thus, the wish list. So I think it's important to make sure as outsiders we do our due diligence and find out what assessments and activities have already been done in a place.
How do you make sure you're positioned to act, provided you can actually identify the "yeast"?
What does this look like on a programmatic, organizational, or national scale? I think maybe it's doing due diligence on a daily basis, acting responsibly and ethically, and then being astute enough to see what you are positioned to do when there's something to be done at critical junctures. Knowing strengths, weaknesses, capacities, mandates, particular situational dynamics. And knowing when you aren't positioned to act, and choosing not to act in those times. Maybe taking those as learning moments to evaluate whether you should/could have been better positioned to act at that time, and what changes you can try to make now to potentially be better positioned in the future.
What analysis does OTI do to find yeast?
I know there is an initial country assessment and 4 criteria for engagement: (1) Is there a window of opportunity? (2) Is OTI uniquely positioned to contribute? (3) Is the operating environment sufficiently stable? (4) Is the country significant to U.S. national interests? (Oooh, my least favorite one!). For more info on engagement criteria, click here. Evaluation of these criteria on the ground (over a 2-3 week period) results in a "go/no-go" decision (Interesting fact: The initial OTI assessment in Afghanistan in 2009 actually resulted in a "no-go" decision. Powers that be didn't like that, and - for better or worse - here we are 2 years later). I'm not sure if there is more structure to the assessment process than simply these criteria; I actually have an RFI in to the DC office to learn more about how this all happens. I don't know if it involves any kind of framework for identifying the people/organizations/parties/type of programs to engage.
In Afghanistan, we use the District Stability Framework (DSF) to identify sources of instability in particular areas and design activities to address them. However, I'm not sure we have a good framework for identifying yeast: change agents and capacities for peace. I don't know if we are really identifying and empowering change agents as part of our stability strategy. I think we could probably be doing more to capitalize on the good already in communities, but perhaps we take for granted (COIN!) that GIRoA is the change agent we're here to empower. Perhaps we are missing other change agents and/or even at times trying to empower the wrong people and networks because we've gone in with the assumption that the government is "the good guys."
Activities that are "strategic and political", not based on "need"
I think there definitely needs to be needs-based assistance. Actors who say, If you're hurt, we'll give you medical attention; If you're starving, we'll give you food, etc. But I don't think needs-based activities help to resolve conflict or build peace. They sustain life and that's what they're supposed to do. Sometimes, needs-based activities can actually exacerbate conflict. Maybe at times this is unavoidable - you can't ask someone if they're going to kill 10 more people before tying a tourniquet on his leg to save his life. Love, I think, can't discriminate. Need shouldn't be ignored - that's why we have OFDA! - but I think you have to be more strategic and political to build peace. We can't ask all organizations to be guided by humanitarian principles, as long as they don't claim to be humanitarian organizations (which OTI doesn't do).
Assistance guided by U.S. interests
First of all, when OTI says its interventions are political, it doesn't necessarily mean what we do is only to serve American political interests, but that what we do is supposed to serve a purpose beyond just meeting a need. It's not about WHAT we do, but WHY we do it. If we build a road, it's not because the community needed a road, but because the road built up people's confidence in GIRoA (for example). We do activities to achieve a purpose beyond just the immediate output. We aren't neutral and we don't claim to be. I do see that this can become problematic when you ask the questions: What values guide our agenda and strategy? How do we determine the political ends we want to see? If we're not neutral, who decides and how do they decide the parties we're going to support? Or even the outcomes or policies? That gets sticky. If it's purely U.S. national interests - then yes, I think that's a recipe for disaster and I don't really want to be a part of it. But if we can somehow be guided by other principles, like global or community interests, I think it's often that those are in our national interests as well.
But it really is different working for USG rather than an NGO. In an NGO you really don't have to think about national interests or strategy or policy - you're driven by your own mission. But OTI is USG. We clearly articulate as one of our engagement criteria that engagement must be in the U.S. national interest. But it seems like even though - in Afghanistan - at times we may be constrained by national policy, I don't get that most people are here just to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan. I sense most OTI people are here because they want to help make Afghanistan a better place for Afghans. We just need to keep thinking critically about policies and strategies that guide our interventions, and ask the question, "Whose interest does this serve?"
Does the why/how/morality behind actions matter if more aren't benefited at the end of the day?
This question pits my principled nature against my pragmatic one. I don't believe the ends justify the means. But I do think there's serious value in questioning the why/how/morality behind actions if the actions aren't actually benefiting people in the end. I think the point of why/how/morality is that it's supposed to benefit other people. If people aren't being helped, maybe you should question your principles. Of course, all this hinges on a definition of what it means to "benefit" people. Certainly there can be short-term benefit that is long-term harmful. And I don't think outcomes in themselves justify principles. If something good happens, that doesn't necessarily mean your why/how/morality is good - sometimes you just get lucky. So I think it's imperative that actions be guided by principles, but then we need to test and refine our principles by what actually happens.
Saturday, 28 May 2011
Why OTI?: Strategic Yeast, and Other Considerations
The mission of OTI is to take advantage of windows of opportunity in countries in crisis to deliver fast, flexible and short-term programming with the goal of generating positive momentum toward peace and stability, and creating or preserving the political space to set a country on a trajectory of success in critical times of transition. While OTI is part of USAID, it is considerably unique from the rest of USAID’s offices in that it has a more flexible financial mechanism that enables it to act quickly and be less limited by bureaucratic regulations. OTI’s mission also doesn’t fall within the traditional definitions of emergency relief or development. OTI does projects that aren’t necessarily based on need, like OFDA or other humanitarian agencies would, but they are more strategic and political. And unlike traditional development, its initiatives are less prescriptive and more flexible and responsive; they are also meant to be short-term, to kind of give a country a jump start and help to create the conditions in which long-term traditional development can be successful.
As for why I wanted to work for OTI: Several years ago I decided to study international peace & conflict resolution because I am deeply troubled by the vast and long-term destruction wrought by war and violence. I wanted to gain the knowledge and skills to contribute to the prevention and resolution of large-scale violent conflict in the world and to build better relationships and reconciliation between people groups and nations. However, during my graduate studies, I began to see that there is a big difference between conflict resolution on an interpersonal or small group level, and what is needed to address the complexity of large-scale political violence and war and to build peace in countries suffering or recovering from the consequences of violent conflict. I care deeply about right relationships between individuals and social groups and I believe in the efficacy of tools like negotiation, mediation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue, and reconciliation activities, but it has become increasingly difficult for me to see how these activities can be scaled up to have a wider impact on a national or international level to consolidate peaceful transitions in countries emerging from conflict.
I have been deeply influenced by the work of John Paul Lederach, and in his book The Moral Imagination, he talks about how what really matters when it comes to building peace, activating social change, and generating positive momentum isn’t critical mass – doing enough dialogue groups, enough problem-solving workshops, enough community reconciliation projects – but finding and activating what he calls the strategic yeast in a society: a small set of the right people involved at the right places. Yeast is the ingredient in a society that has the capacity to make other ingredients grow. When I first read this, I resonated with it, but wondered, “What exactly does this look like? How do you DO it?” Then I started learning about OTI and I saw what it looks like. This is what OTI does – bolstering change agents at critical junctions, taking a catalytic approach, small projects and small injections of funding in the right places at the right times that will have an impact on building positive momentum for peace.
I focused a good part of my graduate work on studying conflict analysis and different conflict assessment frameworks used by various humanitarian organizations. I enjoy analysis and believe strongly that a good understanding of a conflict and context is essential to good, conflict-sensitive programming that will be effective and sustainable. However, I am also disturbed by how many reports are written and how much analysis is produced and yet, how poor the link is between conflict research & analysis and strategies for peacebuilding. For some reason it seems difficult for organizations to do good analysis and then actually use it and transform it into actual programs and projects. I believe conflict analysis, no matter how thorough or accurate, is essentially useless if you don’t actually DO something with it. So I appreciate that people at OTI are doers. They do analysis, but they act fast, they take risks, and they aren’t afraid to make mistakes. One of the catch-phrases at OTI is, "It's better to be 80% right at the right time than 100% right too late."
I think transitions are critically important as windows of opportunity for incredible positive change AND incredible negative change. I appreciate OTI’s emphasis on strategy, but also on timing, on taking advantage of those critical junctions when a small initiative can make a huge difference at the right time.
Topics for Reflection
- Working with the military
- Short-term stabilization - giving people what they want rather than what we think they "need" (in an aid-saturated environment)
- Working exclusively through for-profit implementing partners
- National interest as an OTI criteria for engagement
- COIN as a theory of change
- Strategic Yeast
- Is this really what OTI does?
- Does it work?
- Transformative platforms
- Participatory processes
- What are OTI's assumptions and theories of change?
- Distance from local populations
- "Whole of government"/"One team, one mission"/"Unity of effort" approach
Theories of Change
- Doing small, quick, strategic projects in an area will help stabilize it, i.e. build support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) rather than insurgents, so longer-term traditional development projects are possible.
- When we do projects that make it look like GIRoA is responding to the grievances of a community, the community will have more confidence in GIRoA and will therefore be less likely to support and/or join the insurgency.
- Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will increase people's confidence in GIRoA and decrease support for insurgents, therefore contributing to peace in Afghanistan by reducing support for and the capacity of violent groups.
- As a Field Program Assistant (FPA): By providing administrative, operations and program support to both Field Program Managers (FPMs) and the Regional Representative (RR), I free and enable them to do their jobs better, which results in a great number of and more effective projects, which results in stabilizing and building peace in Afghanistan.
- Cash-For-Work (CFW) projects will help to get community buy-in and work as "entry activities" for new OTI areas, making a way for us to later do more strategic projects.
- Incorporating training into CFW activities means workers will gain skills that will help them be more employable and efficient - this makes CFW more than just short-term income generation.
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