Saturday, 28 May 2011

Why OTI?: Strategic Yeast, and Other Considerations


The mission of OTI is to take advantage of windows of opportunity in countries in crisis to deliver fast, flexible and short-term programming with the goal of generating positive momentum toward peace and stability, and creating or preserving the political space to set a country on a trajectory of success in critical times of transition. While OTI is part of USAID, it is considerably unique from the rest of USAID’s offices in that it has a more flexible financial mechanism that enables it to act quickly and be less limited by bureaucratic regulations. OTI’s mission also doesn’t fall within the traditional definitions of emergency relief or development. OTI does projects that aren’t necessarily based on need, like OFDA or other humanitarian agencies would, but they are more strategic and political. And unlike traditional development, its initiatives are less prescriptive and more flexible and responsive; they are also meant to be short-term, to kind of give a country a jump start and help to create the conditions in which long-term traditional development can be successful.

As for why I wanted to work for OTI: Several years ago I decided to study international peace & conflict resolution because I am deeply troubled by the vast and long-term destruction wrought by war and violence. I wanted to gain the knowledge and skills to contribute to the prevention and resolution of large-scale violent conflict in the world and to build better relationships and reconciliation between people groups and nations. However, during my graduate studies, I began to see that there is a big difference between conflict resolution on an interpersonal or small group level, and what is needed to address the complexity of large-scale political violence and war and to build peace in countries suffering or recovering from the consequences of violent conflict. I care deeply about right relationships between individuals and social groups and I believe in the efficacy of tools like negotiation, mediation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue, and reconciliation activities, but it has become increasingly difficult for me to see how these activities can be scaled up to have a wider impact on a national or international level to consolidate peaceful transitions in countries emerging from conflict.

I have been deeply influenced by the work of John Paul Lederach, and in his book The Moral Imagination, he talks about how what really matters when it comes to building peace, activating social change, and generating positive momentum isn’t critical mass – doing enough dialogue groups, enough problem-solving workshops, enough community reconciliation projects – but finding and activating what he calls the strategic yeast in a society: a small set of the right people involved at the right places. Yeast is the ingredient in a society that has the capacity to make other ingredients grow. When I first read this, I resonated with it, but wondered, “What exactly does this look like? How do you DO it?” Then I started learning about OTI and I saw what it looks like. This is what OTI does – bolstering change agents at critical junctions, taking a catalytic approach, small projects and small injections of funding in the right places at the right times that will have an impact on building positive momentum for peace.

I focused a good part of my graduate work on studying conflict analysis and different conflict assessment frameworks used by various humanitarian organizations. I enjoy analysis and believe strongly that a good understanding of a conflict and context is essential to good, conflict-sensitive programming that will be effective and sustainable. However, I am also disturbed by how many reports are written and how much analysis is produced and yet, how poor the link is between conflict research & analysis and strategies for peacebuilding. For some reason it seems difficult for organizations to do good analysis and then actually use it and transform it into actual programs and projects. I believe conflict analysis, no matter how thorough or accurate, is essentially useless if you don’t actually DO something with it. So I appreciate that people at OTI are doers. They do analysis, but they act fast, they take risks, and they aren’t afraid to make mistakes. One of the catch-phrases at OTI is, "It's better to be 80% right at the right time than 100% right too late." 

I think transitions are critically important as windows of opportunity for incredible positive change AND incredible negative change. I appreciate OTI’s emphasis on strategy, but also on timing, on taking advantage of those critical junctions when a small initiative can make a huge difference at the right time.

4 comments:

  1. I read Lederach's book ages ago for a peace studies course (okay, I admit I read just enough to get through class). At that point in my educational career I was pretty sick of (all the crunchy g.d.) peace studies (hippies), so it didn't make a great impression on me. I remember having a similar reaction regarding the practical application of the yeast metaphor. Thinking of it now, it reminds me of Gladwell's "tipping point," which (you might recall) I also hate. The trouble with the yeast metaphor is knowing where to find it (and then whether or not you need to put it in warm water before it will activate). Once you do locate something actionable the trouble comes in responding in time, if in fact you are positioned to have an influence at all. You seem to have made this connection implicitly in your post with the discussion of conflict analysis. I'm curious about what sort of analysis OTI does in order to find the "yeast" and how the organization makes sure that it has a receptive audience when activating it.

    In response to your comment "For some reason it seems difficult for organizations to do good analysis and then actually use it and transform it into actual programs and projects," my sense is that this has a lot to do with funding. I know of a particular organization (I shouldn't name publicly) that is currently doing a project promoting interethnic peace in part of Kenya where ethnic violence is not really an issue at present. This is being done because the conditions of the grant require that beneficiaries represent multiple tribes, but do not specify that the project be located where there has recently been ethnic violence. It's hard to get enough of the right people together in the remote rural areas where most of the conflict occurred. But it's pretty darn easy to find people from many many ethnic groups hanging around cosmopolitan cities. What's an organization to do though? Turn down money?

    I also want to second your point on interpersonal vesus national / international peace building and the problem of scaling. They're indeed, not the same thing at all. My guess on the subject is that the interpersonal dimension is emphasized in the NGO community because that's a feasible level of intervention for a relatively powerless NGO that's sick of lobbying. I think theories of change based on interventions at the interpersonal level are fairly weak. As a case in point (hopefully one that will stir up some debate) is the Israel/Palestine conflict -- where summer camps, decrement session and group therapy have done (pardon my language) fuck all to change the power dynamics arguably at the root of the conflict.

    Looking forward to more. Cheers, Paul

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  2. Hi Lisa,

    First of all, want to commend you for being so intentional and disciplined in gathering your cult, erm, "reference group" and committing to such regular introspection AND the time it takes to put all these thoughts down paper (or a blog; you know what I mean :)). Anyway, very well done; I think it's a genius idea...I hope you get tons out of it...

    Leaving Haiti (eventually for DC! finally!) this Wednesday, so not tons of time. My feedback is pretty predictable as a guy who's worked for a Swiss (read:ultra-neutral/impartial) Emergency Aid organization: from that perspective, I get very nervous, yeast or no yeast, when activities "aren't necessarily based on need... but they are more strategic and political."

    I'm much more used to needs or rights based approaches (or at least labelling them as such! and Paul makes an excellent point about funding and how much freedom and influence NGOs actually have).

    Providing assistance from a (constantly shifting, but very specific 'mericun) strategic/political point of view raises all kinds of questions that I'm sure everyone's discussed ad nauseum. This is when everyone orders a tall one and discusses morality *behind* actions and whether or not it makes a difference if people are being helped at the end of the day...Is it worth sticking our humanitarian principles if, as part of a nation's foreign policy and strategic interests, more of an impact is made through an organization like OTI than an Oxfam? Does the why and the how really matter in the end if OTI's activities benefit 100,000 people (or the yeasters that will affect that number) vs. the 10,000 that Oxfam supports?

    And then we get into how we measure things like "impacts" and "benefits" and "support" and whether more numbers mean anything at all :)

    Got to go. Have a goodbye party to prepare for! Thanks for posting! I'll be in the thick of these questions soon with OFDA. Hope all is well in Kandahar!

    Joe

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  3. There are some definite down sides of working directly for/in the US government. In the end, everything is about promoting policy and politics. However, helping to cease conflicts and ease suffering generally is in our national best interest, so you get to do what you want while spending our tax-payer money... so I see that as a plus :)

    As for Afghanistan, I do not like how our national strategy changes so rapidly and then people like you and I are forced to sell this nonsense to the people we are supposedly there to help. For example, will the Afghan national government ever work as a steward of the people? Particularly since the people really have very little recourse and government accountability is nonexistent. For example, I am leaving shortly to go to a remote area of Afghanistan. There, I am supposed to help convince and train them to fight off "malign actors", under the auspices that their government will support and protect them after we leave. In most cases, I don't believe that this will happen. So what sort of failure are we setting them up for? I wish I knew.

    I just hope that you can maintain your same hope and optimism throughout this whole process. Not every endeavor can be the success that we initially hoped for and this certainly has the potential go that way.

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  4. This is A-mazing!!! I am so HONORED to be a part of this dialogue.

    I am very much looking forward to learning about HOW OTI identifies the "yeast" and "yeast" for change towards WHICH direction? Change that the Afghans need/want? Or is it the American agenda? How do we even know which is which with such a complex and messed up history?

    I love that one of your Topics of Reflections is working through for-profit implementing partners. I have a very bitter, sour, disgusting and yet addictive taste lingering in my mouth about the tax-payer's money flowing through for-profit companies for doing good for the society. The for-profit companies behave just like a for-profit while keeping up the burn rates to win another contract. I want to continue to chew on this with you. Would love to hear what you see/hear/taste.

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